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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the issue of network topology control in wire-
less networks using a fully distributed algorithm is consid-
ered. Whereas the proposed distributed algorithm is designed
applying game theory concepts to design a non-cooperative
game, network connectivity is guaranteed based on asymp-
totic results of network connectivity. Simulations show that
for a relatively low node density, the probability that the pro-
posed algorithm leads to a connected network is close to one.
Index Terms— Wireless Sensor Networks, Distributed
algorithms, Game theory.
1. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have received much atten-
tion in recent years as a technology useful to estimate physi-
cal parameters of a given area in order to, for instance, mon-
itor processes or detect and prevent environmental disasters.
Some WSN applications, e.g. forest ﬁres, may require a large
amount of nodes. The feasibility of these networks thus relies
on the development of cheap nodes with low energy consump-
tion and limited processing capabilities. In these networks,
the use of distributed processes based on the exchange of lo-
cal information among the nodes only is of great interest.
One important issue in WSN is the topology control prob-
lem since it plays a fundamental role in the behavior of the
network. A connected network (or group of nodes if the net-
work is organized in clusters) is usually required in order to
ensure the delivery of packets to a fusion center in a central-
ized WSN, or in order to reach a consensus in the estimation
or detection of events in decentralized WSNs. Since connec-
tivity may vary with time due to malfunctioning nodes or node
mobility, the network should be able to dynamically adjust the
topology, preferably, in a self-organized way. Several topol-
ogy control algorithms can be found in the literature [1], they
are either centralized algorithms that require global network
information or distributed algorithms with a constraint on the
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minimum number of neighbors each node should have to en-
sure certain topology properties.
In this paper we address the problem of network topol-
ogy control and propose a distributed algorithm to adjust
the transmission power of each node formulated as a non-
cooperative game where nodes exchange information only
with their neighbors. Game theory is a collection of models
and analytic tools useful to study interactive decision pro-
cesses [2, 3]. Therefore, it provides a framework to solve in a
distributive fashion the problem of adjusting the transmission
power of the nodes in a WSN guaranteeing connectivity and
with an energy-efﬁcient solution. In [1] the authors present
examples of topology control games and a distributed algo-
rithm that guarantees convergence to a connected network.
However, this algorithm requires global information ﬂowing
through the network to check at each iteration the connec-
tivity or not of the network. Our contribution relaxes this
assumption and proposes a fully distributed algorithm based
on local information only.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce some general concepts of game theory. In Section 3
we present the game proposed to adjust the node transmission
power and a procedure to locally estimate the connectivity of
the network. Section 4 shows the simulation results and Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2. GAME THEORY BASICS
We limit our discussion to non-cooperative models that ad-
dress the interaction among individual rational decision mak-
ers. Such models are called games and the rational decision
makers are referred to as players.
A strategic non-cooperative game Γ(Ω, A, u) has three
main components:
• Ω is the players set, s.t. Ω = 1, . . . , N with N the
number of players in the game.
• A is the set of strategies and a = [a1, . . . , aN ]T ∈ A =
×Ni=1Ai. ai ∈ Ai represents the strategy of the i-th
player over the set of its possible strategies. Similarly,
a−i ∈ A−i = ×Nj =iAj represents the strategies of the
rest of N − 1 players.
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• ui : A → RN is the utility function of the i-th player.
The utility function (or payoff) quantiﬁes the prefer-
ences of each user to a given strategy. Then, u =
[u1, . . . , uN ]T is the vector of all N utility functions.
Then, a non-cooperative game is an iterative procedure
where, at each iteration, players chose the strategy that max-
imizes their utility function. The Nash equilibrium (NE) is a
stable solution of the game in which no player may improve
its utility function by unilaterally deviating from it.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Nash Equilibrium) An strategy proﬁle a∗ is
a Nash equilibrium if, ∀i ∈ Ω and ∀ai ∈ A,
ui(a∗) ≥ ui(ai,a∗−i) (1)
In general, games may have a large number of NE or may
not have any. Thus, it is of interest to design the utility func-
tion in a way such that the game has at least one equilibrium
point. It is proved in [4] that when the utility functions used
by the players are concave, the existence and uniqueness of
a NE is proved. However, the utility function may be de-
signed according to a criteria which could eventually yield to
non-convex functions. In those cases, there is another way
for deriving sufﬁcient conditions for existence and unique-
ness of the NE in a game based on the so-called potential
games, [5]. This type of games is given when the incentive
of all players to change their strategy can be expressed by a
global utility function V . We refer to an exact potential game
(EPG) when the game admits an exact potential function, i.e.,
a player-independent real valued function that measures the
marginal payoff when any player deviates unilaterally (see
[5] for details). An ordinal potential game (OPG) is another
type of potential games which require having an ordinal po-
tential function that has the same directional behavior as the
individual payoff function, when that individual unilaterally
deviates. More rigorous deﬁnitions follow.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (EPG) A strategic game Γ(Ω, A, u) is an ex-
act potential game if there exist an exact potential function
V : A→ R s.t. ∀i ∈ Ω,∀a−i ∈ A−i and ∀ai, bi ∈ Ai
V (ai,a−i)− V (bi,a−i) = ui(ai,a−i)− ui(bi,a−i) (2)
Deﬁnition 2.3 (OPG) A strategic game Γ(Ω, A, u) is an or-
dinal potential game if there exist an ordinal potential func-
tion V : A→ R s.t. ∀i ∈ Ω,∀a−i ∈ A−i and ∀ai, bi ∈ Ai
V (ai,a−i)−V (bi,a−i) > 0⇔ ui(ai,a−i)−ui(bi,a−i) > 0
(3)
As stated in the following Lemma (see [5] for the proof),
the game deﬁned by the utility function V presents the same
NE points as the original game whenever it is an OPG game.
Lemma 2.4 also holds for an EPG game since it is a particular
case of an OPG game.
Lemma 2.4 Let Γ(Ω, A, u) be an OPG and V the corre-
sponding ordinal potential function. If a ∈ A maximizes V ,
then it is a NE.
3. GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO
DISTRIBUTED POWER AND TOPOLOGY
CONTROL
The aim of this section is to develop a fully distributed al-
gorithm to adjust the transmission power of each node in
a WSN so that the network becomes connected with an
energy-efﬁcient solution. The algorithm is formulated as a
non-cooperative game where nodes exchange information
only with their neighbors.
3.1. A Game Theoretical Algorithm
For the problem at hand, the players are the nodes and the
game is that of ﬁnding a NE such that each node is trans-
mitting at a minimal power while maintaining the network
connected. Thus, the set of strategies that the i-th node can
chose are the set of its possible discrete power levels Pi. Con-
sequently, we can deﬁne the instantaneous vector of power
levels as p = [p1, . . . , pN ]T ∈ P = ×Ni=1Pi as the vector
containing the power of each node. We also assume that, at
the beginning of the game, the nodes transmit with their max-
imum power level to gather neighbors information and the
network is connected.
In order to achieve the NE in the strategic non-cooperative
game Γ(Ω, P, u), nodes iteratively decide its power transmis-
sion by maximizing its utility function,
pˆi = arg max
pi∈Pi
{ui(pi, pˆ−i)} (4)
After each iteration, a node power level change affects the
overall topology of the network which is taken into account
by the other nodes when optimizing their utility function.
As mentioned in Section 2, the iterative best response al-
gorithm in (4) yields to a NE or not depending on the design
of the utility function. Therefore, we aim at designing a util-
ity function with a NE that preserves connectivity but with a
more energy efﬁcient solution than the initial topology with
all nodes transmitting at maximum power. Following the re-
sult in [1], the utility function of Proposition 3.1 is considered.
Proposition 3.1 The game Γ(Ω, P, u) where the individual
utilities are given by
ui(pi,p−i) =
{
pi,max − pi if network is connected
−pi otherwise
(5)
is an EPG and the exact potential function is
V (pi,p−i) =
⎧⎨
⎩
pi,max −
∑
i∈Ω
pi if network is connected
−∑
i∈Ω
pi otherwise.
(6)
Proof: We prove it by applying the concept of EPG in
Deﬁnition 2.2. Consider qi, pi ∈ P s.t. qi < pi, then we have
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that
Δui = ui(pi,p−i)− ui(qi,p−i) = qi − pi (7)
whether the network is connected or not. Similarly, we con-
struct the potential variational as
ΔV = V (pi,p−i)− V (qi,p−i) (8)
= −
⎛
⎝pi + ∑
j∈Ω;j =i
pj
⎞
⎠+
⎛
⎝qi + ∑
j∈Ω;j =i
pj
⎞
⎠
Thus, Δui ≡ ΔV ⇒ V is an exact potential function and the
game Γ(Ω, P, u) is an EPG.

The designed game falls in the category of EPG games
and, as stated in Lemma 2.4, ﬁnding the NE point of (5) is
equivalent to maximize the potential function in (6). If we
examine (5) and (6), we may see that the value of pi that
maximizes both the utility function and V is the minimum
transmission power for what the network is connected, if any.
For the sake of clarity, a pseudocode of the procedure is
shown in Algorithm 1. That is the sequence of iterations that
a node i executes before deciding its own power level, pi.
Notice that each node runs the best response algorithm in (4)
Niter times in parallel and not necessarily synchronized. It
is important to remark that we assume each node knows the
transmission power level used by its neighbors. This informa-
tion can be easily included in the packets exchanged between
nodes if there is a discrete set of power levels.
At the light of the proposed utility function, the main con-
cern is to determine whether the network is connected or not.
This point was not addressed in [1] which was mentioned as
future work. However, this point is challenging if one aims at
designing a fully distributed algorithm that uses local infor-
mation only. In Section 3.2 the issue of determining network
connectivity with only local information is addressed.
3.2. Distributed Connectivity decision
In order to check the connectivity of a network we have to
resort to graph theory principles. This theory describes the
communication ﬂow among the nodes of a network by an
undirected graph G = (V ,E ) where V = {1, · · · , N} is
the set of vertices (nodes) and E is the set of edges (links) [6].
The edge eij represents a bidirectional communication link
between a pair of distinct nodes i and j. The set of neighbors
of node i is deﬁned as Ni = {j ∈ V : eij ∈ E } for all
i, j = {1, · · · , N}, and represents the set of indexes of the
nodes sending information to node i. A path in a graph G is
a sequence of alternating nodes and edges that starts and ends
at different nodes, such that each edge is incident to its pre-
decessor and successor node. The graph is connected if there
exists a path between any two nodes, and the connectivity (or
Algorithm 1 Game Theoretic algorithm at node i.
Require: Pi = {pi,1, . . . , pi,max}
Ensure: pi
Initialization:
1: Ni,p = dim{Pi}
2: pi = pi,max  Pi(Ni,p)
3: Collect neighbors information: p−i ∈ Ni
∣∣
pi,max
Algorithm iterations:
4: for k = 1 to Niter do
5: for m = 1 to Ni,p do
6: pi = Pi(m) and Ni ← Ni
∣∣
pi
7: Check Network connectivity as in Algorithm 2⇒ γi
8: if γi == 1 then
9: Compute ui(pi,p−i) = pi,max − pi
10: else
11: Compute ui(pi,p−i) = −pi
12: end if
13: ui(m) = ui(pi,p−i)
14: end for
15: pˆi = arg max
pi∈Pi
{ui(m)}
16: end for
topology) of the graph is described by the N × N Laplacian
matrix L, with entries
[L]ij =
⎧⎨
⎩
d
(out)
i i = j
−1 i 
= j & eij ∈ E
0 otherwise
(9)
where d(out)i stands for the outdegree of node i, and corre-
sponds in our case to Ni. If the set λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ · · · ≤ λN
denote the eigenvalues of L, by deﬁnition we have λ1 = 0. If
the graph is connected, from spectral graph theory results we
have that the algebraic multiplicity of λ1 is equal to one and
L is an irreducible matrix [7].
Therefore, global information of the network is needed
to check its connectivity since the computation of the second
smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian is required. However, we
are interested in a procedure to check connectivity but based
on local information only. In [8] the authors have obtained
a lower bound on the communication radius r(n) in order to
ensure connectivity with a high probability. Speciﬁcally, it is
shown that if n nodes are placed in a disc of unit area in R2
and each node transmits at a power level so as to cover an area
of πr2(n) = (log(n)+ c(n))/n, then the resulting network is
asymptotically connected with probability one if and only if
c(n)→ +∞. A common choice for c(n) is c(n) = K log(n)
with K > 0. The radius r∗ computed as
r∗ =
√
log(n)
n
(10)
can be used as an asymptotical threshold so that if r(n) de-
creases faster than r∗, then the probability that the network is
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connected tends to zero as n increases. Conversely, if r(n)
decreases slower than r∗, then the probability that the net-
work is connected tends to one. The methodology proposed
to check connectivity is detailed in Algorithm 2. For each
power level, pi, the node estimates the node density as the
relation between the number of neighbors transmitting with
a power less or equal to pi and the coverage area. Then, the
threshold rˆ∗i is estimated with this node density. The decision
on the connectivity is taken comparing the actual coverage ra-
dio ri with the threshold. Since this procedure is based on an
asymptotic threshold function, its performance will improve
as the node density increases.
Algorithm 2 Local Check of Network connectivity.
Require: pi,Ni
Ensure: γi
1: Obtain ri from pi
2: Estimate node density: nˆ = dim{Ni}
πr2i
3: Evaluate threshold: rˆ∗i =
√
log nˆ
nˆ
4: if ri > rˆ∗i then
5: γi = 1⇐ network connected
6: else
7: γi = 0⇐ network not connected
8: end if
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed algorithm has been simulated and validated by
computer simulation. The WSN is generated by randomly
placing nodes in a 10 × 10 meters square. We consider the
same set of discrete power levels for each node. Since the
decision on network topology is based on asymptotical as-
sumptions, i.e. when n → ∞, the algorithm has been tested
in order to evaluate its validity. Figure 1 shows the probabil-
ity of having a connected graph after running the algorithm
versus node density deployed in the ﬁeld area. Results show
that it is required a minimum density of nodes to guarantee a
certain probability of obtaining a connected network.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studies the problem of power and topology control
in a distributed WSN using game theory tools. The novelty of
the work is that network connectivity is achieved with a fully
distributed algorithm based on a non-cooperative game as the
node density increases. The proposed algorithm is based on
a non-cooperative game and asymptotic results for network
connectivity. The algorithm is validated through computer
simulation results, were the asymptotic behavior as the num-
ber of nodes increase becomes apparent.
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Fig. 1. Probability of having a connected graph as a function
of node density.
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